











Since the 2005 Land Summit, new ap-
proaches to land reform have been on 
the agenda, yet there remains little 
clarity on the way forward. The main 
focus has been on means of accelerat-
ing the redistribution of land through 
new modes of acquiring land. Acquisi-
tion is an important matter but if treat-
ed in isolation risks mis-specifying the 
core problems evident in land reform 
in South Africa. 
A new phase of land reform located 
within a wider agrarian reform is 
needed and will require new institu-
tional arrangements. Any alternative 
strategy will have to revise the insti-
tutional mechanisms that have been 
handling land reform thus far: are the 
procedures and the institutions that 
are in place to design and implement 
land reform adequate and appropriate 
to the kind of new tasks envisaged? 
What new farming units and activities 
are intended, and what post-transfer 
support will be required to make this 
agricultural system productive? This pa-
per explores mechanisms appropriate 
to one kind of agricultural alternative: 
a vision of a productive, small-scale es-
sentially household farm sector. 
What kind of land 
reform?
Most critical comment on South Africa’s 
land reform has focused on the ‘willing 
buyer, willing seller’ (WBWS) mode of 
land acquisition. However, one other 
dimension of past programmes also 
needs critical re-examination: South 
Africa has so far sought to conduct the 
transfer of land on a one-by-one basis, 
matching the seller of an individual 
property to a speciﬁc group of pur-
chasers, and with a plan speciﬁc to that 
farm. In such practice, the government 
plays only a facilitating role. In some 
other experiences – Namibia since the 
1990s and Zimbabwe in the 1980s – the 
WBWS formula simply meant no com-
pulsory purchase and transfers through 
the market, at current prices, but the 
willing buyer was government. 
One consequence of the South African 
practice of WBWS is that properties 
are acquired and transferred one-by-
one, and a farm or business plan has 
to be drawn up for each land transfer. 
This has proved to be a major bottle-
neck and has also added greatly to the 
costs of the programme. This practice 
in effect militates against the possibili-
ties of smallholder farming. The em-
ployment of a separate consultant and 
drawing up of detailed business plans 
would hardly be economically justiﬁ-
able for one smallholding. An analogy 
with the housing programme would be 
to require a separate architect to draw 
up plans for each house, to be commis-
sioned by and possibly paid for by the 
prospective occupant. If that had been 
the practice, the country would be even 
further short of meeting the needs of 
the homeless. Instead, the country’s 
housing programme was made possi-
ble by whole estates being planned on 
the basis of one or a very few model 
structures; the only way such an ambi-
tious building programme could have 
been achieved. In the housing context 




seen to be absurd, yet it has been the 
one followed in land reform and must 
be rethought if large numbers of ‘dis-
advantaged’ are to beneﬁt.
This reliance on owners to determine 
which land will be sold, and the one-
by-one process of land transfer, has 
the further consequence that it has 
precluded broader strategic planning 
of land reform. As a result there is no 
clear understanding of the ultimate 
intention of land reform. There could 
never be a one-formula-ﬁts-all strategy 
in South Africa as the large commer-
cial farm sector encompasses a range 
of different types of production units 
– but not an inﬁnite variety, such as to 
defy the kind of categorisation that 
aids planning. The type of agriculture 
that has resulted from land reform 
since 1994 is in no sense clear-cut but is 
whatever the buyers and their business 
plan consultants – and subsequent trial 
and error – have made of it. 
I illustrate (Cliffe, 2000) the enormous 
scale and diversity of actual projects 
– and thus the impossibility of using 
them to generate replicable models 
– by citing a mix of redistribution out-
comes ranging from two brothers on 
a peri-urban smallholding running a 
garden and livestock fattening busi-
ness, to an integrated and effective ir-
rigation cooperative of 20 households 
working collectively, to the transfer of 
ownership of a former ‘black spot’, to a 
legal entity representing a community 
of almost 10,000 people trying to clear 
some small communal ﬁelds and oth-
erwise allowing gardens and common 
grazing on the rest.
Policy, too, is vague about what kinds 
of farming are to be promoted. The 
small grants available under the initial 
Settlement / Land Acquisition Grant in 
practice required applicants to pool 
their resources and form some common 
property group, such as a communal 
property association (CPA) or a Trust, 
and government ofﬁcials have tended 
to assume that each existing holding 
would continue to be farmed as a unit.
The Land Redistribution for Agricul-
tural Development (LRAD) programme 
from 2001 increased the size of grants, 
targeting would-be commercial farm-
ers, but also required matching inputs – 
and retained the requirement of a busi-
ness plan prior to grant approval, and 
thus the one-by-one transfer approach. 
The conception of the type of farming 
remained vague, beyond distinguish-
ing ‘food security’ or ‘production for 
markets’, which may differ in their pur-
pose and the scale of production – but 
with no conception of forms of produc-
tion. Will either or both of these types 
be mechanised? Will they be based on 
individual family farms or some corpo-
rate or cooperative working pattern? 
The other type of project under LRAD 
is the buying into existing farm enter-
prises through equity schemes. Obvi-
ously, here the production unit would 
remain essentially unchanged.
Historically in South Africa and other 
‘settler’ farming systems, the notion of 
a ‘viable’ size of operation has put legal 
blocks on sub-division but, on scrutiny, 
these are based on a ‘minimum income 
target’ that has nothing to do with 
calculations of efﬁciency or livelihood 
creation (Van den Brink et al., 2006). It 
is remarkable that this bias within the 
agricultural establishment has survived 
the transition to South Africa, and re-
mains intact even within a programme 
of land reform. Attention must now be 
paid to the neglected question of what 
kind of farming systems should be the 
outcome of land reform. No district lev-
el planning, as is now being rolled out 
through area-based planning (ABP), is 
possible without including a clariﬁca-
tion of this issue, or it will merely lead 
to the replication of a version of the ex-
isting agrarian structure. In particular, 
it is not possible to specify what kind 
of pre- and post-transfer support is re-
quired, and thus what agencies need 
to be in position with what resources, 
unless there is greater resolution of this 
issue. 
The failure to clearly specify an alterna-
tive farming system is indicative of an 
enduring hostility to smallholder farm-
ing as at least one possible end-product 
of land reform – as several commenta-
tors have noted, including those as dif-
ferent in their outlook as Ben Cousins 
of PLAAS and Rogier van den Brink of 
the World Bank. This alternative per-
spective has pointed to the advantages 
of smallholder production:
• it can be commercial (not always syn-
onymous with ‘subsistence’); it can 
be a mix of production for own con-
sumption and for markets;
• it can be more intensive and provide 
more livelihoods in a given area;
• it can lead to inverse returns to 
scale;
• it can be located on sub-divided hold-
ings to make use of underutilised 
land; 
• it is available to a wider range of 
beneﬁciaries, including the poor.
This paper strongly concurs that an 
alternative policy framework for land 
and agrarian reform in South Africa 
must include smallholder farming as a 
major element. But the kind of small-
holder production, and the other op-
tions that should be promoted (e.g. 
workers’ cooperatives on existing farm 
units) should be worked out in terms 
of what is appropriate to objectively 
deﬁned social needs and agro-eco-
logical parameters. Speciﬁc proposals 
then need to be worked out at the 
provincial and district levels. So much 
is acknowledged in some of the current 
discourse. 
Alternative strategies should not nec-
essarily seek the short-run optimisa-
tion of total production and yield per 
hectare, but rather aim to provide in-
creased numbers of livelihoods from 
the land presently in the commercial 
farm sector (including that which is not 
fully utilised). The large farm sector has 
lost workers on a huge scale in the last 
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20 or so years. By 2002 total employ-
ment in agriculture had dropped about 
30% from some 1,320,000 in 1985 to 
940,000 in 2002. The loss of livelihoods 
is illustrated more dramatically by tak-
ing into account that the number of 
those in full-time employment has al-
most halved, as a result of labour being 
made more casual. There is an implicit 
assumption that such losses are a result 
of ‘efﬁciency gains’ but they may be a 
consequence of land being left idle or 
changes in types of production. No sys-
tematic research has been done to clar-
ify the reasons for this trend, and thus 
no strategies are on offer to counter it. 
The large-farm commercial sector has 
been leaking a generation of people 
and livelihoods – the exact opposite of 
what economic development and anti-
poverty programmes require. The chal-
lenge is to design a land reform strat-
egy that can reverse that trend and aim 
to have not just more people dwelling 
on the land but more people gainfully 
occupied, getting part if not the whole 
of their livelihoods from the land.
New institutional 
requirements
Alternatives to the past programmes of 
land redistribution will require agen-
cies to perform new or amended roles. 
The resolutions of the Land Summit 
mark a departure from earlier policies 
in two main directions: a more rapid 
and efﬁcient transfer of land with 
priority to the needs of the poor, and 
the acquisition of at least some of the 
land through compulsory purchase. 
Future policies will have to be worked 
out about what kinds of land will be 
targeted for transfer – whether geo-
graphically deﬁned, or by type or ex-
tent of current usage, or by some equi-
ty criteria like ceilings on holdings. And 
mechanisms to operationalise planning 
and targeting of such pro-active acqui-
sition will have to be speciﬁed. A les-
son from other countries’ experiences 
is that the planning and execution of 
land acquisition should be undertaken 
with the type of future production sys-
tem and beneﬁciaries in mind. A rec-
ognised weak link in land reform so 
far has been the provision and coordi-
nation of all kinds of ﬁnancial, exten-
sion and infrastructural support. If new 
strategies for targeting land for acqui-
sition for speciﬁc production systems 
and beneﬁciaries are indeed to include 
a strong emphasis on intensive small-
holder farming, speciﬁc new tasks of 
designing programmes and providing 
support for such small-scale production 
will be required. This has not been part 
of the one-by-one approach in South 
Africa, and it is questionable whether 
any existing institutions are presently 
equipped to perform such roles.
Land reform always involves a complex 
set of activities requiring a wide range 
of skills and expertise. This is more 
the case when it is planned as part of 
a broader process of agrarian reform 
wherein support is provided to those 
who receive land for the consolidation 
of their productive activities and live-
lihoods on a sustainable basis. Moreo-
ver, land reform is by deﬁnition an in-
tensely political matter. 
The policy guidelines coming out of 
the Summit imply either new tasks, 
which are beyond the core business or 
the capabilities of existing agencies, or 
involve some public bodies taking on 
new responsibilities that have so far 
been privately transacted. The institu-
tional issues can be summarised in this 
list of questions: 
• If the willing buyer/willing seller 
model is not to be the sole method 
of acquisition, what mechanisms, 
including the legal instruments, will 
plan and approve the designation 
of such land and expropriate such 
farms? Which land is to be acquired? 
Where? Who will decide this and on 
what basis?
• Presumably, some form of compul-
sory purchase will legally necessitate 
acquisition by some public body, 
possibly for onward disposal. Should 
such an agency also, as in some Latin 
American countries, purchase such 
land as continues to be offered by 
willing sellers rather than all trans-
fers being to some ultimate willing-
buyer user?
• Which institution will plan new farm-
ing systems appropriate to new land 
users, and how will this be coordinat-
ed with the identiﬁcation of people’s 
needs and the targeting of land, 
so as to ensure that land acquired 
is appropriate for alternative land 
use after redistribution? Will this be 
achieved through a unifying agency 
or close collaboration between de-
partments?
• How should infrastructure, service 
provision and credit be linked to 
beneﬁciaries at the appropriate stag-
es? Existing provisions are currently 
inadequate and performed by differ-
ent central and local government de-
partments, the land bank and other 
agencies.
• How should the participation of com-
munities and civil society be ensured 
in these functions?
The legacy of South Africa’s institu-
tional structures and actual experience 
with land reform has left a deﬁcit of 
appropriate and effective mechanisms 
to perform these roles. Planning and 
coordination of the kind indicated has 
been weak and scarcely involved any 
unit beyond the project or individual 
farm. Moreover, some of the responsi-
bilities are unclear or shared between 
national and provincial departments, 
local government, non-governmental 
organisations, the private sector and 
out-sourced bodies. Despite the debate 
on alternative policies, little attention 
has been given to which institutions 
will be needed.
However, the massive and glaring miss-
ing link in existing agencies is who is to 




regionally appropriate spatial plans for 
smallholder farming units. No existing 
agency currently sees this as its remit, 
and few of the existing bodies have the 
specialist technical expertise required. 
One institutional option is a single, 
dedicated land reform agency that 
takes on the task of coordinating all 
these functions – either a government 
department or a parastatal. This is a 
model that has been pursued, in differ-
ent forms, in a number of other coun-
tries that have undertaken substantial 
agrarian reforms. Some knowledge of 
these comparative experiences may 
provide a useful reference point. There 
are two key distinctions among these. 
First is the kind of transition, whether 
from pre-capitalist mode of produc-
tion (landed estates or landlordism) 
or from large-scale capitalist farming, 
and whether to smallholder, medium 
or large capitalist farming, cooperative 
or state farm. South Africa’s planned 
transition is largely from existing large-
scale capitalist farms, although it is not 
clear what production units are to be 
created. Sometimes the policy objective 
seems to be either to ‘Africanise’ them, 
with or without sub-division, as private 
or cooperative enterprises, or to sub-di-
vide them into small farm properties. In 
the case of the latter, the experiences 
that correspond closest to it are Peru 
and, in Africa, Kenya and Zimbabwe.
Distinctions are also drawn between 
the circumstances in which land reform 
is launched: as part of a revolutionary 
or post-revolutionary surge (as in Mex-
ico, Bolivia, Cuba, Chile and Nicaragua, 
and Algeria and Zimbabwe) as opposed 
to more of a reformist and negotiated 




Land reform measures can be traced 
back to the early part of the 20th cen-
tury, after the revolution in Mexico in 
1912, in Bolivia after the revolution of 
1952, and of course in Cuba after 1959. 
But the high tide of land reform was in 
the 1960s when some 15 countries en-
acted land reform legislation – most of 
it ‘from above’, and with the intention 
of pre-empting social unrest, rather 
than as part of a social revolution. 
The pattern in most countries was to set 
up a specialist, dedicated, multi-tasked 
and multi-disciplinary body. The spread 
of this formula was not accidental as 
there had been a continental Inter-
American Committee for Agricultural 
Development (CIDA) which provided 
a network for exchange of thinking 
on land reform, among other agrar-
ian challenges, and an accumulated 
pool of expertise and insights. Several 
countries also launched agrarian re-
form institutes, which became impor-
tant repositories of research ﬁndings, 
knowledge and expertise that could 
fuel reforms and provide an unparal-
leled understanding of the dynamics of 
agrarian society. Often these institutes, 
with their committed personnel and 
knowledge, provided information and 
mobilisation to civil society bodies as 
well as providing expertise to govern-
ment.
The Latin American experience still pro-
vides a useful checklist of what has to 
be addressed and coordinated to avoid 
failure, even if it is no longer fashion-
able that all these tasks and the coor-
dination should be solely government 
functions. 
The major share of responsibility of 
executing the agrarian reform will 
have to be borne by the govern-
ment… But our governments in prac-
tice rarely act as if they were a unit, 
and indeed one of the more serious 
problems from this point of view of 
the organization and efﬁcacy of ac-
tion is the coordination of the activi-
ties of the various organs of govern-
ment… For the success of an agrarian 
reform process it is necessary to act 
simultaneously and complementarily 
in various ﬁelds: land has to be re-
distributed among the peasant ben-
eﬁciaries; they have to be organized 
and given credit in order to carry out 
various investments and to operate 
the new enterprises that are cre-
ated; they have to receive the timely 
supply of various productive fac-
tors; they have to receive technical 
training and education; their crops 
have to be bought at prices that will 
compensate them for their efforts; 
markets and cooperatives have to 
be organized; the produce has to be 
bought and distributed to urban cen-
tres, etc. All these functions are com-
plementary and if one of them does 
not work well or fails, a large part of 
what is being done in the other areas 
will be frustrated (Chonchol, 1964).
In Columbia, a new agency, INCORA 
(Instituto Columbiano de Reforma 
Agraria) was set up in 1961, with re-
sponsibilities for the acquisition of land 
through voluntary purchases from will-
ing sellers and compulsory purchases of 
land that met the legislation’s criteria 
for purchase (above ceiling size or un-
der-utilisation), the distribution of such 
land and of state lands earmarked for 
redistribution, development of infra-
structure in support, provision of ag-
ricultural credit to beneﬁciaries, and 
the direct running of irrigation and 
drainage projects. Under a more pro-
gressive government from 1966, IN-
CORA greatly expanded its budget for 
acquisitions and other purposes. It also 
promoted peasant associations to mo-
bilise for expanding land reform, which 
later led to some invasions, but also to 
a National Association of Peasant Ben-
eﬁciaries that provided political sup-
port for land reform measures and also 
provided a part of the administrative 
structure through which the reforms 
were implemented. After 1971, under a 
conservative government, the pace of 
land reform and the extent of INCO-
RA’s role were slashed; a moratorium 
was declared on its further acquisition 
of land and it was criticised by the right 
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wing for its support of radical rural so-
cial movements.
In Peru, the 1964 reforms were aimed 
at bringing the landed estates in the 
mountains (the Sierra) into ‘modern’ 
farming, although, in fact, they had 
become partly commercialised. These 
reforms achieved little, except to spark 
land invasions by peasants. The radical 
military government enacted its own 
land reform in 1969, targeting instead 
the export-oriented commercial plan-
tations in the coastal area (De Janvry, 
1981). Commercial enterprises were 
expropriated and converted into coop-
eratives, mainly comprised of the previ-
ous workers on the plantations – one 
of the most extensive reforms in Latin 
America. One crucial task was the pro-
vision of state-appointed management 
advisers to liaise with the agricultural 
cooperatives (CAPs) and issue them 
with advice (often, in fact, directives). 
Later governments partially reversed 
this process and parcelled out the co-
operatives’ land, as part of structural 
adjustment. One institutional innova-
tion in Peru was the setting up of in-
dependent land tribunals which had 
the ﬁnal say in appeals about whether 
a landowner could, by virtue of size or 
under-utilisation of holdings, be sub-
ject to the rules for takeover. Thus one 
dimension of expropriation was not di-
rectly in the hands of a central agency. 
Financial institutions of government 
were also involved as the system of 
compensation was through deferred 
payments of bonds, which in turn were 
supposed to ﬁnance industrial growth. 
In Chile, the ﬁrst land reform under 
Christian Democratic governments in 
the 1960s was intended to pre-empt so-
cial unrest and to ‘modernise’ agricul-
ture. The Agrarian Reform Corporation 
(CORA) was empowered to purchase 
land from willing sellers – though the 
law allowed deferred payments in the 
form of 25-year bonds – and to expro-
priate under-utilised land and land 
above certain ceilings (Bellisario, 2007). 
An Agricultural Development Institute 
(INDAP) not only conducted research 
but promoted peasant and trade un-
ions and cooperatives to give a popular 
push to the process, and it was esti-
mated that half the campesinos were 
organised under such bodies. Under 
Allende’s Popular Unity government, 
the head of INDAP, an agricultural en-
gineer, became Minister of Agriculture 
and implementation was given a much 
greater thrust (six times more land 
was redistributed in the ﬁrst year than 
in the previous six years). In addition, 
agricultural marketing, input supply 
and credit agencies were nationalised, 
though not placed under CORA, so 
there had to be mechanisms for coordi-
nation. In fact, there was close collabo-
ration between CORA and the Ministry 
of Agriculture, both under dynamic, 
committed leadership. They, in turn, 
fed into Centres for Agrarian Reform 
that organised tenants, former workers 
and nearby peasants on the ground, so 
as to beneﬁt from the reforms. 
In Venezuela in the 1960s, a National 
Institute for Agriculture (IAN) was set 
up as an autonomous agency of the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock as 
the ‘responsible executing agency’ for 
land reform. Its responsibilities covered 
land acquisition, assessment of com-
pensation to be paid, determination of 
sizes and holdings to be allocated, ac-
tual distribution of land, construction 
of basic infrastructure, technical assist-
ance and extension and administration 
of the Agriculture & Livestock Bank. 
By the 1970s and 1980s, most Latin 
American countries had shifted to ‘in-
tegrated rural development’ without 
land redistribution. In the process, 
these institutions were dismantled and 
much of the accumulated knowledge 
and experience was lost. Venezuela, 
Bolivia and Chile are exceptions where 
some emphasis on land reform has re-
emerged in the new millennium.
African experiences
Experiences comparable to South Af-
rica are limited to the former ‘settler 
colonies’ where there was extensive 
occupation of the land by white im-
migrants. This history also left a legacy 
(as in South Africa) of a distinctly dual-
ist structure of agriculture, with large-
scale commercial farms, ranches and 
plantations on the one hand, and on 
the other, ‘reserves’ of peasant family 
holdings variously constrained by limits 
on land, access to markets and support 
services, ﬁnance and legal prohibitions. 
This dualism was reﬂected in the bipo-
larisation of government structures. 
Departments of agriculture provided 
high levels of servicing, often includ-
ing the design of farm plans, as well as 
credit and inputs and state marketing 
exclusively for the white-owned land; 
and ‘native administrations’, concerned 
with social control and land matters, 
with some added-on farming support 
services. Clearly, land reform designed 
to reverse the dualism also required 
some governmental restructuring of 
this inherited divide between service 
provision for large farms and mere ad-
ministration of land and people in the 
‘reserves’. Those countries that have 
undertaken signiﬁcant redistribution 
of that land include Algeria, Mozam-
bique and Angola. But the cases in the 
anglophone ex-colonies of Kenya and 
Zimbabwe are most relevant.
Kenya was the ﬁrst anglophone ex-set-
tler colony to launch a programme of 
transferring land from white to Afri-
can farmers. The Million-Acre Scheme 
launched in 1961, just before independ-
ence, targeted one type of farming 
enterprise in the former ‘White High-
lands’: the owner-manager individual 
holdings under mixed farming (mainly 
maize, wheat and cattle), particularly 
those bordering the African ‘reserves’ – 
but left untouched the tea, coffee, sisal 
and sugar plantations. It was initially 
led by a Land Settlement and Develop-
ment Board, heavily inﬂuenced by the 
interests of the white farming commu-
nity in determining which land should 
be transferred, but this was replaced 
by a Central Land Board, which became 




The Ministry of Lands, later amalga-
mated with the Ministry of Agriculture, 
was also responsible for post-transfer 
support of the smallholdings. 
In sum, there was a coordinated agency 
at the core of resettlement but the re-
lations between this body and minis-
tries and departments were character-
ised by political confrontation. And in 
wresting some control from the white 
settlers, some of the coordination over 
the acquisition and the settlement 
processes, and between administration 
of land transfer and support to post-
transfer farming was lost. After the 
10 years that the Million Acre Scheme 
lasted, the state withdrew from land 
redistribution; indeed, there was no 
longer any coordinating body such as 
the Central Land Board and thus no in-
stitutional memory lasted. 
In Zimbabwe, after independence in 
1980, the new government set itself the 
aim of resettling 165,000 peasant fami-
lies on formerly white-owned farms. 
The land and agricultural departments 
that had dealt with white farming ar-
eas and communal areas were brought 
together under one Ministry; the two 
distinct extension and servicing depart-
ments were combined within the Min-
istry to form AgriTex, responsible for 
agricultural infrastructure, extension 
and production support, which was a 
considerable store of technical know-
how. 
However, the land acquisition unit in 
the separate Ministry of Lands oper-
ated autonomously from AgriTex and 
from the new coordinating agency for 
resettlement, DERUDE (see below). It 
bought up a stock of some 2.5 million 
hectares – about 30% of the white-
owned farms – in the short period from 
1980-82. Its decision of which farms on 
offer to purchase (many of which had 
been abandoned during the liberation 
war) was taken without any real consid-
eration of suitability for resettlement, 
and this was the basis for criticism by 
the planners who later had to put it to 
use. Many of the acquired farms bor-
dered communal lands, often the site 
of ﬁghting during the war, but by and 
large the less fertile areas. Out of this 
inherited structure, mechanisms had to 
be put together to design and imple-
ment a programme for resettlement, 
involving continuing acquisition of 
white-owned farms and the resettling 
of African farmers on the land. 
The planning branch of AgriTex in the 
separate Ministry of Agriculture de-
signed the land-use formulae and the 
physical layout to be used on the former 
commercial farms and thus the whole 
nature of the ‘resettlement schemes’. 
Its considerable technical expertise and 
experience, however, was based on 
‘land use planning’ of single large-scale 
commercial enterprises, so they had to 
adjust their thinking to smallholder al-
ternatives without much experience. 
(Alexander, 2006 and Moore, 2005 
both criticise this technicist approach 
and its bureaucratic implications.) Ag-
riTex proposed four models for the 
schemes, of which the most widespread 
by far, Model A, envisaged smallholder 
farming: individual households were 
allocated a homestead plot, arable 
ﬁelds plus shared access to a sizeable 
area to be used in common for graz-
ing livestock and collecting ﬁrewood 
and other natural products. This model 
provided for sub-divided arable plots, 
pegged out by AgriTex, for each small-
holder household, with provision for 
common grazing.1
A third agency, and one that was spe-
cially created for the purpose rather 
than a ‘retread’ of old agencies, the 
Department of Rural Development 
(DERUDE), was then set up within a 
third Ministry, Local Government, Rural 
and Urban Development, and charged 
with selecting households from those 
registering their need, placing them on 
the plots, administering the schemes, 
and coordinating the construction of 
infrastructure, extension and access 
to credit. Many of the new ﬁeld staff 
recruited for these tasks were ex-lib-
eration movement ﬁghters, who saw 
themselves as mobilisers and on the 
‘side of the people’; of a different ilk 
from the old guard of the settler-co-
lonial bureaucracy. Although DERUDE 
came into existence too late to coor-
dinate acquisition with planning of 
schemes, it did develop some coordinat-
ing expertise and also provided a pro-
reform political constituency within an 
otherwise conservative bureaucracy. It 
did eventually come close to being a 
‘dedicated’ land reform agency.
These three institutions were scaled 
back in the late 1980s and DERUDE was 
ﬁnally disbanded in the early 1990s as 
part of structural adjustment. In the 
process, much accumulated experi-
ence was lost. The absence of any co-
ordinating agencies has meant that the 
Fast Track Land Reform since 2000 has 
suffered not only from an absence of 
planning, but also left new land users 
with limited, if any, support for pro-
duction. The sheer scale and speed of 
these recent transfers have also been 
such that the institutions to provide 
technical support, credit, inputs and 
administration (including settlement of 
the many disputes over the transferred 
land) have been overwhelmed.
Implications for South 
Africa
There is no single structure that is ideal 
in all situations. What is appropriate 
will depend on the political context and 
the strategy for land reform. However, 
a number of criteria may be isolated:
• From a public administration per-
spective, it is important to have a 
capable single agency or set of insti-
tutions that can plan and implement 
this demanding task.
• Sheer capacity has to be on a scale 
sufﬁcient for the extent of the oper-
ation and a major quantitative shift 
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would be necessary for South Africa 
to reach its targets.
• Choices have to be made about the 
extent to which new bodies are cre-
ated or existing ones restructured 
and redirected to undertake the re-
quired new tasks.
• Given the multi-disciplinary nature 
of the tasks and the several stages 
of the process, coordination is a high 
priority. One strategic decision is how 
to achieve this: a dedicated agency 
or committees that network and can 
command executive authority.
• Both property and bureaucratic in-
terests will be challenged in any land 
reform. The political task is not to 
inﬂate the opposing interests but 
to assess and mobilise the political 
forces that are likely to support the 
reforms. 
Several of the country experiences 
above offer examples of a dedicated 
agency attempting to coordinate, if 
not always being the sole implementer 
of, a range of activities. However, the 
problems of coordinated planning and 
implementation were often contested 
and subject to conﬂict – perhaps inevi-
tably. In reconstituting institutions ap-
propriate for a second stage of land re-
form in South Africa there are lessons, 
both positive and negative, that might 
be applied.
One lesson is that countries were vic-
tims of past institutional architectures 
rooted in their past politics. South Afri-
ca is similarly constrained by the inher-
ited dichotomous responsibility along 
racial lines for agriculture, land and 
local government, with the great pre-
ponderance of expertise and resources 
in those that ministered to whites. A 
further problem in getting institutions 
right is that the Constitution speciﬁes 
Land Affairs as a national government 
competency, whereas operational re-
sponsibility for agriculture is with pro-
vincial governments. There are obvious 
beneﬁts to housing all relevant func-
tions under one institutional roof. But 
this may sideline land reform in prac-
tice, if such a body is starved of a strong 
political voice at the centre of govern-
ment and of the means to implement 
its plans, including an adequate budget 
of its own. 
DLA, which has been central to land 
reform, at present does not have the 
expertise for some tasks or the will to 
be coordinator. Municipalities, charged 
with coordinating local economic de-
velopment, may not be able to draw 
in national or provincial departments, 
especially Agriculture which must have 
some crucial technical role. Responsi-
bility for some required tasks, e.g. for 
design of area-based plans, and state 
purchasing of land, is not clearly speci-
ﬁed.
A new multi-disciplinary, dedicated land 
reform agency would perform a range 
of tasks. But where would it be located 
and to whom should it be answerable? 
Would it be a specialist unit within mu-
nicipalities, or an autonomous body 
with a degree of independence? How 
would civil society organisations and 
rural communities themselves have an 
input into planning and holding the 
implementers accountable? Participa-
tory structures should ideally seek to 
coordinate non-government bodies 
within plans, rather than have them as 
alternatives to government. Experienc-
es elsewhere in the world suggest that 
civil society bodies are crucial in driving 
broad popular mobilisation without 
which public bodies might be reluctant 
to move at all. 
The conclusion offered here is not to 
draw up a new organogram or blue-
print, but to urge the need for policy 
debates to include a working group 
that can look at the range of organi-
sational reforms that will be needed to 
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